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REFLECTIVE PRACTICE

Eyes Wide Open: Learning as
Strategy Under Conditions of
Complexity and Uncertainty
Patricia Patrizi, M.A., Elizabeth Heid Thompson, B.A., Julia Coffman, M.S.,
and Tanya Beer, M.A., Evaluation Roundtable
Keywords: Strategy, learning, indicators, complexity, uncertainty, foundations, evaluation, adaptation

Key Points
· Foundation strategy is hampered by a failure to
recognize and engage with the complexity and
uncertainty surrounding foundation work. This
article identifies three common “traps” that hinder
foundation capacity to learn and adapt: 1) linearity
and certainty bias; 2) the autopilot effect; and 3)
indicator blindness.
· This article urges foundations to alter their mindset, questions, and processes to foster a more
committed approach to strategy and adaptation.
In essence, it argues for learning as strategy.
· This article draws on literature from systems
theory, business strategy, and philanthropic practice as well as data from foundation benchmarking
surveys.

With the emergence of strategic philanthropy,
foundations have altered in significant ways how
they work. They have moved from a responsive
relationship with their grantee communities to
a position that assumes more responsibility for
identifying and framing problems, as well as for
designing strategies to address them. An important assumption behind the adoption of this role
in philanthropy is that foundations can use their
position and resources to be good at strategy.
But to be good at strategy, foundations need to
be good at learning. However, foundations have
not cracked the nut of how to learn about, adapt,
and improve strategy in ways commensurate with
their potential to meet their strategic aims.
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While learning is important for strategic success
in most circumstances, it becomes essential when
foundations engage in the complex environments
characterizing much of what they support under
the mantle of strategic philanthropy. In fact, in
these circumstances, learning is strategy.
Through this work, foundations engage in many
large and extraordinarily difficult and complex
concerns: improving food security in Africa;
addressing global warming, poverty, or issues
of equity in difficult urban settings; transforming social-service delivery systems or creating
new and far more integrated systems. Some of
these foundations have attempted to be comprehensive in their strategic approach, hoping to
address root causes of deeply entrenched social
problems; some have organized communities
to take up common cause for greater “collective
impact;” others believe that they can bring about
the greatest impact by infusing large sums of
resources toward a problem in a targeted manner,
thereby stimulating whole systems to respond.
Each scenario has no certain or widely accepted
solution, but common to all of these efforts is the
expectation that foundation work can bring about
large-scale social impact.
Yet in the face of the often mind-boggling complexity of this work, foundations have tended to
remain above the fray, particularly as strategies
unfold – distanced from what some have called
the “mess” of social change (Schall, 1994; Schon,
1973). This distance has raised questions from
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both philanthropists and observers about whether
foundations have a role in strategy at all (Buffet,
2013; Stannard-Stockton, 2009). These and other
critics question whether foundations are close
enough to the actual work on the ground to make
decisions wise enough to guide strategy effectively
(Patrizi & Thompson, 2011; Martin, 2012).
As leaders of the Evaluation Roundtable, we
have observed and participated in foundation
struggles to be better at learning, particularly as
it relates to strategy. Through our benchmarking
work with the Evaluation Roundtable (Evaluation Roundtable & Patrizi Associates, 2010), our
former jobs in foundations, and our opportunities
to consult with foundations, we have witnessed
much change in how foundations approach learning – but also persistent barriers to their capacity
to do so.
We have seen the role of evaluation expand
considerably over the last 10 years, in part corresponding to the growth of strategic philanthropy.
Foundations now pursue many avenues to collect
and present information about their strategies
and to report progress to their boards. Recent
benchmarking data suggest that foundations apply evaluation throughout the strategy life cycle
at least at acceptable levels (Center for Evaluation
Innovation, 2013). However, deep frustrations
persist about what foundations know about their
strategies. One study found a majority of foundation chief executive officers as having identified
obtaining “meaningful insights” from evaluation
as a challenge (Buteau & Buchanan, 2011, p. 9). In
another, foundation trustees said that among various aspects of foundation governance, they were
least satisfied with the information they received
to assess the foundation’s progress against its
strategy (Buchanan, Buteau, DiTroia, & Hayman,
2005).
In the most recent Evaluation Roundtable Benchmarking Survey, one quarter of evaluation staff
reported that their foundations are doing a poor
job of using evaluative information in midcourse
decisions and to make summative judgments
about program or initiative performance (Center
for Evaluation Innovation, 2013). They also point-
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Characteristics of Complex Situations
• High uncertainty about how to produce desired
results and great disagreement among diverse
stakeholders about the nature of the problem
and what, if anything, to do
• Results that are highly dependent on initial
conditions
• Nonlinear interactions within a dynamic system
• No right answers
• Key variables and their interactions unknown in
advance  
• Each situation is unique
Michael Patton: Developmental Evaluation

ed to dissatisfaction about “the extent to which
foundations use evaluation data to understand
how complex strategies ‘unfold on the ground’”
(Coffman, Beer, Patrizi, & Thompson, 2013, p.
46). Although more data than ever are available
to foundation strategists, we heard persistent
concerns about how this information actually gets
used to inform strategy. As one practitioner said,
“We have lots of data, but it is challenging to get it
into the work of the strategy team.”
We take the position in this article that foundations have important but unrealized potential to
contribute value to strategy by capitalizing upon
their capacities to build, support, and engage
in learning. Their location in the landscape of
social-change agents affords them a rare line of
vision to see patterns and to work across boundaries of organizations, systems, and peoples. They
have the resources to import both experience
(from doers) and expertise (from researchers and
experts). They can afford to experiment and try
multiple solutions. And if disciplined about their
own commitments and biases, they can work to
counteract the kind of blind spots and confirmatory tendencies that frequently undermine organizational capacity to learn (Kahneman, 2011;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Foundations have faltered, however, in maximizing this potential. They have downplayed
the complexity of their work and in many cases
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ignored the uncertainties surrounding their
strategic enterprises. This article explores what
we see as a series of self-created “traps” that
hamper foundations in advancing the kind of
robust learning needed to guide strategy in these
complex environments. Drawing on a deep body
of work on action research (Lewin, 1946; Schon,
1973, 1983; Argyris, 1982, 1993; Reason, 2006,
2007) and our own experience working in and
with foundations, we propose a framework to assist foundations to avoid these traps and advance
a practice of learning strong enough to validate
their adopted role as strategists.

An alternative mindset and approach are needed.
Under conditions of uncertainty, foundations
need to acknowledge what they do not know and
cannotcontrol and commit to learning their way
to better strategy. This is no small matter. It puts
the value of strategic philanthropy in question: To
be good strategists in these settings, foundations
need to become good learners and to position
learning itself as a core strategy. If foundations are
to meet the challengeof strategic philanthropy,
they must guard against these traps and enter into
the complexity and uncertainty of their work with
their eyes wide open.

Strategy Trap 1: Linearity and Certainty Bias
Foundation strategy development took a leap
• linearity and certainty bias, which occurs when forward in the late 1990s with the development
of the theory-of-change approach (TOC) (Weiss,
foundations frame their strategies as a set of
1995). As designed, its purpose was to foster
linear, causal, and certain actions and fail to
better understanding of comprehensive commuaddress the complexity surrounding the issues
nity change initiatives. These community change
and systems they hope to change;
• the autopilot effect, which occurs when founda- efforts are characteristic of the type of work that
foundations pursue through their strategies (e.g.
tions distance themselves from strategy as it
collective impact, system change), both then and
unfolds, thereby failing to learn from implenow. The TOC approach was intended to help
mentation; and
communities and foundation strategists articulate
• indicator blindness, which occurs when
their theories about how change in their complex
foundations track and monitor their strategies
environments occurs and, more important, to
through performance indicators that reinforce
remind them that, at best, they had working theothe linear, causal, and often-unchecked asries about change and not tried-and-true recipes.
sumptions built into the work.
The TOC approach sought to 1) expand and
foster recognition of the deep interconnectedness
When caught in these traps, foundations apamong system elements, actors, and intervenproach strategy in ways that minimize and ultitions; and 2) shed light on the underlying assumpmately trivialize the amount of uncertainty they
tions of the TOC and the uncertainties associated
face in their theories of change, in the questions
with them.
they ask of their strategies, in the information
they collect, and in how they assess their strateBy introducing “assumptions” into strategic
gies.
thinking, the TOC was developed as a tool to
drive home the point that strategy in complex
Strategy and all that follows, such as mid-course
settings is a highly conditional proposition. For
reviews and measurement, are often operationinstance, many foundations “assume” that there
alized as bureaucratic artifacts and processes.
will be a ready demand for the supply of whatever
Strategy comes to be understood as a relatively
predictable set of actions, sometimes even serving a strategy might produce – models, knowledge,
data, or collaboration; through the articulation
as a “blueprint.” Targets are assumed to be realized as planned (milestones), and performance is of “assumptions,” the TOC would allow examination of the barriers to adoption and thereby
monitored accordingly.
encourage consideration of how a strategy should
address these barriers. Strategies are populated
The three traps are:
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BOX 1

The Dynamics of Complex Social Programs (Pawson, Wong, & Owen, 2011)
• Programs are active, not passive. Interventions do not work in and of themselves; they only have an
effect through the reasoning and reactions of their recipients.
• Programs have long implementation chains and multiple stakeholders. Recipients are many and varied;
reactions to programs thus differ; outcomes are thus generally mixed.
• Programs are embedded in complex social systems. Recipients are rooted in different localities, institutions, cultures, and histories, all of which shape the fortunes of a program.
• Programs are implemented amid the turbulence of other interventions. The policy agenda is delivered
through a multitude of interventions, each one interfering with the reception of another.
• Programs beg, steal, borrow, and adapt. Practitioners work constantly to improve the delivery of interventions rather than preserving uniformity to meet evaluation and trial requirements.
• Programs are the offspring of previous interventions. Social problems are long-standing; interventions
evolve to try to combat them; the success of a current scheme depends on its history.
• Programs change the conditions that make them work in the first place. An intervention’s success is
always time limited since alleviating a problem always involves changing its concomitant causes.

by complex actors with minds of their own who
interact with one another as well as participate
in other “strategies,” thereby producing complex
and unpredictable interactions and effects. (See
Box 1.) Rather than serving as a "blueprint for action," the TOC approach was designed to increase
awareness of the system of actors, conditions,
and dynamics – both at the outset and ongoing.
Doing so was to provide the focus and drive for
better questions, knowledge development, learning, and strategy-course correction.

cietal change expected). Connections are depicted
by arrows between the columns, and the table is
often accompanied by a set of performance indicators aligned with the outputs and outcomes.

As practiced, however, the TOC approach frequently has not met these aims. Although foundations may go through theory-of-change exercises
as they develop their strategies, the resulting
products rarely are seen as the living documents
they were intended to be. Worse yet, as many
of these documents mask both the complexity
and uncertainty of the undertaking, they may
undermine or even nullify the perceived need
for ongoing learning. Even when complexity and
uncertainty are acknowledged, they tend to be
downplayed as strategy discussions move higher
up the foundation ladder from program staff to
management and, ultimately, to boards.

The linearity depicted between what the foundation will support and the anticipated outcomes
can be strikingly misleading:

The illustration of strategy in this manner, while
easing communications, obscures a great deal of
important information as it tends to downplay
assumptions and, in particular, creates the illusion
that the work is simple and certain and can be
understood in simple and certain terms.

• Nearly all of these documents filter out any
indication of serious challenges or factors that
might impinge upon foundation aims. Yet history tells us that such factors will greatly shape
whether or not progress toward outcomes and
impact can be or is being made. More consideration of who wins and who loses in strategy is
warranted.
• Few documents offer serious examination
of the major assumptions behind how larger
impact will occur, and when they do, they tend
to be underdeveloped. Assumptions proliferate
The typical foundation strategy document takes
regarding how foundation-supported “leaders”
the form of a table organized into columns preor “research” will “amplify” or “multiply” the efsenting lists of recommended interventions or acfects of their interventions into broader impact,
tions, outputs, outcomes, and impact (broader soTHE
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Few would argue that much of
strategic philanthropy is anything
but long term, uncertain, and
nonlinear, but as strategy ambitions
have risen in foundations, so too
has the drive to portray strategy as
simple, certain, and under control.

without articulating how this will realistically
happen. Other assumptions often come in the
form of “greater knowledge will lead to better
decisions” or “demonstration of new ways of
working will lead others to follow.” Yet how
this expected leverage will actually occur, while
central to strategy success, often goes unarticulated and therefore, not addressed in the
strategy.
• The context surrounding a strategy is rarely
treated as being dynamic or of consequence.
Issues of context might concern the adequacy
of the workforce to carry out the strategy
or other contextual issues related to system
specific elements. For example, traditional
academic disciplines have a stronghold on
how professors are promoted, thereby limiting
the capacity of new lines of research to take
hold; community-service providers and school
systems may not cooperate in the “systems”
proposed by foundations because they report
to and are funded by different authorities, even
though they may serve and hold similar goals
for the same population. Local circumstances
can produce local variations that need to be
considered in strategy. Unfortunately, many of
these factors often are ignored until undesirable results emerge. Then “issues of context” are
introduced post hoc as plausible explanations
for what went wrong.
• Few foundation strategy documents address
how a strategy will incorporate new informa-
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tion so that it can be adapted during implementation. In other words, few strategies articulate
the questions that should arise from recognized
uncertainties, which in turn would provide the
impetus to learn more as the strategy unfolds.
This tendency to oversimplify strategy from the
start and throughout is inconsistent with indisputably high levels of complexity found in foundation efforts to foster social change. Few would
argue that much of strategic philanthropy is anything but long term, uncertain, and nonlinear, but
as strategy ambitions have risen in foundations,
so too has the drive to portray strategy as simple,
certain, and under control. A recent interview
with a director of a large grantmaking program
shed some light on why. Responding to an observation that his theory of change was fraught with
many unstated assumptions, particularly in light
of the highly ambitious nature of his goals, the
director said that his manager told him, “These
assumptions are fine, but get rid of them before
it goes to the president and the board – this will
never do; it is too messy.”
The core of the problem may reside high up in
foundations. Boards send strong signals to staff
about their expectations for managing complexity when they assert, “If you know what you are
doing, you can say it easily and succinctly.” When
boards request that all reporting on strategy be
limited to red-, yellow-, and green-light indications of stop, caution, and go, they encourage
obfuscation of complexity. It is not surprising,
therefore, that interviews with foundation staff
suggest that foundation CEOs struggle to find
“the silver data bullet” that will assure the board
of progress.
Likewise, the well-intentioned effort to increase
foundation transparency by making foundation
theories of change public as a communications
tool has pushed theories toward simple drawings and “elevator speeches.” The relatively recent
increase in the call for an elevator speech is often
tied to strategy clarity; clarity is tied to simplicity;
simplicity to certainty; and certainty to the veneer
of competence.
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Strategy Trap 2: The Autopilot Effect
Foundation attention to learning from strategy
implementation has been a persistent problem
over the years we have benchmarked foundation
strategy and evaluation efforts. While foundations
often point to the pressures of “payout” as an
explanation for the low level of attention strategy
implementation receives, we posit that a kind of
benign “unknowing” is at play. This may allow
foundations to make major commitments while
keeping themselves insulated from actualities
surrounding their strategies that, if fully detailed,
might halt any decision. This very well may be
human nature or what Hirschman (1961) has
called the “hiding hand,” which allows decision
makers to take risks without being immobilized
by feelings that they need to know everything
prior to taking action. Therefore, the challenge for
any strategist is to be able to distinguish between
what is acceptable and unacceptable risk and what
kind of knowledge is associated with either.
One response might be that program staff need to
know more before proposing funding. Although
this may be somewhat warranted, “knowing
more” can only go so far in complex settings
where much will remain out of the range of
“knowability” until work begins. It might, therefore, help foundation strategists to think about
the “Rumsfeld Principle” – to sort through their
priorities for learning before and during strategy:
There are known knowns. These are things that we
know we know. There are known unknowns. That is
to say there are things that we now know we don’t
know. But there are also unknown unknowns. These
are things we do not know we don’t know. (Rumsfeld,
2002)

Much of the knowledge needed to support
strategy can arise only during implementation.
For example, how organizations react to each
other’s new initiatives will surface only over
time. Although some dynamics of change in
a system might be “knowable” before strategy
launch, much of what needs to be learned about
these dynamics depends upon actual experience.
One experience we know well surfaced in a case
study of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s
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grantmaking “to improve care at the end of life.”
Largely through their work with grantees, the
foundation and their partner, Project on Death
in America, came to understand that demand
for palliative care was controlled by specialists
(such as oncologists or neurologists) who were
not inclined to give up on pursuing a “cure” for
their patients; nor were most patients interested
in a “good death.” Much learning took place
through trial and error, in part through market
research, before advocates and the foundations
realized that there was a stalemate between those
who perceived that care (palliation) could be a
complement to cure and those who perceived
that care would have to displace efforts to cure.
The foundation learned from their experience and
that of their grantees that the stalemate might
be broken if they could find ways to incorporate
“care and cure,” by developing palliative-care
specialists who could work by the side of those
physicians most intent on cure (Patrizi & Patton,
2010; Patrizi, Thompson, & Spector, 2008).
Even when a foundation strategy is seen as
relatively predictable, problems will arise. Success often is contingent upon whole systems of
organizations being able to work together differently and better to produce services in a timely
and coordinated manner. Invariably, things break
down. People are unprepared, delivery systems
don’t work, and anticipated funding from other
sources evaporates. These problems require ongoing discussion and consideration.
So too, foundations tend to overestimate their
ability to command the attention and commitment of others and underestimate competing
claims on the same. Competition surfaces from
newer initiatives, thereby affecting the capacity of
foundations to hold the attention of their partners.
And uncertainties multiply as interventions engage "systems." Interdependencies emerge among
and between many different component parts of
change, frequently across organizational entities in order for the “whole” of the intervention
to work. For instance, while “collective impact”
efforts are designed to address interdependen-
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Rather than learning as strategy
unfolds, fidelity to the plan is
emphasized when foundations ask:
Did we do what we said we would
do, did we meet our objectives,
and did it result in the promised
outcomes? Efforts to assure fidelity
build on the assumption that
the plan is correct and that the
foundation’s job is to assure that it is
implemented accordingly.

the change effort missing? Which strategy elements are getting traction, where, and why? What
kind of resistance is encountered and why? How
do emergent policies affect change? What are we
learning about the kinds of capacities that are
needed in order to execute strategy well? What
are we learning about leverage assumptions?
What levers actually move a system and how?
The failure to learn during strategy implementation is a serious problem. A large and well regarded body of research, going back to the seminal
studies of the War on Poverty programs, points
to implementation issues as key, if not central, in
program failure (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973).
What was learned then and what has emerged
repeatedly in implementation studies is that
strategy implementation is highly unpredictable
– opposition emerges, allegiances change, and
important elements of the context shift, sometimes dramatically.

Under conditions of uncertainty, fidelity to the
plan can seriously mislead decision makers either
by attributing core strategy problems to poor implementation or allowing a weak strategy, which
goes according to plan, to proceed unchecked
and therefore uncorrected. With the mindset of
fidelity in place, even when a strategy is known to
These examples require strategic attention. But
work, the strategist may fail to examine difficult
far from learning from implementation, formal
attention to strategy tends to be organized around and challenging conditions, alternatives, and,
most important, how organizations and beneficiaways to track or monitor strategy according to
ries actually experience the work. It treats learnmeasures reflected in the plan – that is, how it
ing from strategy implementation as a relatively
was articulated in the theory of change.
remote and inconsequential exercise.
Rather than learning as strategy unfolds, fidelity
Strategy Trap 3: Indicator Blindness
to the plan is emphasized when foundations ask:
Did we do what we said we would do, did we meet A centerpiece of strategic philanthropy is its focus
on results. And results drive questions about how
our objectives, and did it result in the promised
well a foundation performs against its desired
outcomes? Efforts to assure fidelity build on
outcomes. Indeed, Paul Brest, former president
the assumption that the plan is correct and that
of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, has
the foundation’s job is to assure that it is implesuggested the term “outcomes-oriented philanmented accordingly. In this case the strategist is
thropy,” which he defined as
not seeking information that might lead to more
fundamental adjustments to the strategy beyond
alignment with the plan.
where donors seek to achieve clearly defined goals,
cies, participants need to commit to learn about
and address one another’s inconsistencies and
shortfalls such that they can make the “whole”
work better. This takes time and commitment to
learning.

Ignored are important questions, such as: Do we
have what we need to do this work? Are parts of

56

where they and their grantees pursue evidence-based
strategies for achieving those goals, and where both
parties monitor progress toward outcomes and as-
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sess their success in achieving them in order to make
appropriate course corrections. (Brest, 2012, p. 42)

This perspective is not an isolated one; great
interest has been generated by movements toward managing to outcomes (Morino, 2011) and
results-based accountability (Friedman, 2009).
Consequently, outcomes tracking and data collection have increased dramatically. Evaluation staff
report that more resources are being applied to
tracking strategy performance, with report cards
and dashboards proliferating as the favored devices, especially for reporting to boards (Center for
Evaluation Innovation, 2013). These report cards
are populated with indicators and their associated
metrics. Indicators often emerge early in strategy
development, usually attached to a nascent theory
of change. Indicators tend to correspond to the
inputs, outputs, and outcomes identified in the
TOC document.
Whether this drive toward a range of performance measurement and management approaches is appropriate for complex strategies warrants
some serious consideration. A recent edition of
New Directions for Evaluation, devoted to performance management, identifies two conditions
needed for effective use of indicators: “Performance measurement ... works on the twin assumptions that the operational theory of change
is correct and will lead to intended outcomes, and
that internally measured data are valid” (Hunter
& Nielson, 2013, p. 9). For instance, we know that
immunizations work. Since we know already that
immunizations are effective, tracking the delivery
of immunizations can provide valid information about how the health system, in this case,
performs.
This kind of certainty, however, does not characterize much of the work supported under the
umbrella of strategic philanthropy. Whenever
interventions focus on creating change in highly
dynamic systems with unpredictable reactions
and results, uncertainty exists on many levels:
from whether the requisite human and organizational capacities are in place to launch the strategy to how the surrounding market for services
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and products responds and affects the strategy in
important ways.
In light of all of these unknowns, when foundations adopt performance indicators that reinforce
the belief that the linear, causal, and oftenunchecked assumptions built into the strategy
theory of change are certain, they fall into the
“indicator blindness trap.” Rather than treating
strategy elements as the tentative hypotheses that
they likely are, foundation investment in tracking
indicators can become far more deterministic of
all that follows.
Also, used poorly, indicators can misinform and
misdirect subsequent actions and distract foundations and grantees from asking and exploring
more salient questions. For instance, it is rare for
an indicator to provide insight into the degree
to which core strategy assumptions hold up. In
complex situations where causal links are unclear,
tracking indicators as though “what gets done” is
equivalent to achieving an outcome (such as the
case with immunizations) is misleading – as what
gets done might not work.
However, indicators have an appropriate role in
strategy. And some indicators are better than others. Indicators provide basic information about
“how much” of something exists, be it a condition,
behavior, or characteristic. They can point to the
amount of a problem, asset, or concern. As such,
they can inform ballpark estimates of the size of
a problem. Indicators can also help draw attention to issues of concern, drive good discussions
among stakeholders, and point to the need for
more thoughtful analyses.
For the most part, indicators need to be approached with great care and should not be used
without thought about the behavior they will
motivate. For instance, the goal of “hitting a quantitative target” historically has distorted behavior
toward an emphasis on more rather than better.
Many of the indicators foundations employ tend
to consist of raw counts and are not based on
knowledge of whether what is measured is predictive of an outcome. Likewise, targets are set without understanding the thresholds of performance
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of any one indicator or the interaction among
them, and data are often presented without the
contextual or qualitative information that could
help make their meaning more apparent.
Nor do indicators provide answers to questions,
as they offer little useful insight into how and why
performance varies. Donald Campbell, a scholar
of social experimentation, captures the core of the
indicator trap in his advice to evaluators to treat
indicators as questions rather than as answers
(1977). Yet foundations’ adherence to indicators
as a gauge of strategy performance reflects a level
of certitude that ends up precluding both the asking and the answering of good questions.
Results, of course, are important. However, when
foundations push on “results” before they know
whether what they fund actually works, they
install a kind of compliance mentality that will
likely undermine grantee capacity to adapt and
respond appropriately. As the adage goes, what
gets measured gets done – whether it produces
results or not. So while results matter, when foundations drive on measurement prematurely and
without commensurate reflection, conversation,
and adjustment based on learning, they are likely
to derail learning and progress.

Advancing the Practice: Building Strategic
Learning Capacities
The heart of the strategy formation process can
be found in learning from tangible experience and
visioning from creative insights.
– Henry Mintzberg (2007)

This article presents a case and an approach to
help foundations avoid the traps we have described and to arrive at better ways to learn in
complex and uncertain strategy situations. This
shift toward learning will require foundations
to make changes in how they think and act as
strategists – in their mindset about what constitutes strategy and learning, in the nature of the
questions they ask and the kind of information
they value, and ultimately in the processes they
construct to reflect upon and improve strategy as
it evolves.
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By adopting strategic learning many small things
would change. For instance, theories of change
would include hypotheses and assumptions. They
would not predict with false precision how the
change process and its impact will occur 10 or
more years down the road, but instead would
make predictions contingent on what is learned
during implementation. Questions would focus
on building understanding of “what is” rather
than focusing on “whether what was planned was
done.” Questions of “why,” “how,” and “for whom”
would become at least as important as “what” or
“how much.”
Larger and more fundamental changes are needed
as well. Authoritative single perspectives would
give way to more inclusive approaches. Areas of
core uncertainty would become opportunities to
build understanding and increase shared perspectives. And recognition of real disagreements and
conflict is allowed. Strategy is not seen as “one
and done,” but as adaptive and evolving.
Ultimately, this work must be supported by
foundation leaders. Foundation executives must
build the appetite among their board members to
hear more of the substance behind the work that
they fund and come to understand and accept
the depth of their reliance upon their grantees to
navigate uncertain terrain. Foundation executives
and boards can contribute in important ways to
the evolution and sophistication of the strategy by
fostering the kind of useful debate that can challenge staff to grapple more with those who think
differently. They can ask for and thereby encourage more discussion about what has not worked
well just as much as what has. The cost for the
board is likely to be perhaps more to read; on the
other hand, the payoff is that all parties will know
more and have more of a chance to form a deeper
understanding of the complex work that the foundation supports.
Shift the Mindset
We appreciate that foundation boards and staff
confront a broad spectrum of anxieties as they
propose and engage in strategy: the inherent risks
associated with funding uncertain strategies (Can
we make a difference? What if it doesn’t work?);
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the sufficiency of due diligence before making
a funding decision (Did we learn everything we
could to assure that this will work?); and early
and ongoing concerns about progress (How will
we know if our strategy is working?). Typically,
foundations believe that the most important
decisions are made at the outset because that is
when the most risk is actually experienced.
This is where indicators and report cards have
played what we see as a largely symbolic role.
Much of performance tracking and the indicators used by foundations at the outset reinforce
an illusion of manageability, control, and accountability in complex circumstances. “To track
a strategy” conveys the message that a funder
knows what to do, how to do it, and can manage
strategy performance to the desired outcomes.
In essence, they serve as a symbol of strategy
certainty and control. In reality, this sense of
certainty and foundation control is fleeting and
indicators provide inadequate guidance to those
who need to make actual strategy decisions.
Strategic learning requires foundations to make
several changes in their approach to strategy:
• These endeavors are, by definition, ongoing,
long haul, and will necessarily evolve; therefore learning and strategy decisions need to be
iterative.
• There is more that is unknown about a strategy
than what is known, therefore better diagnosis
and more informed capacity can be developed
only by doing the work, thinking about it, and
importing experience and knowledge into
strategy decisions.
• Rote strategy tracking needs to give way to
questions, reflection, and strategy adaptation.
One of the most important changes that must
accompany this work is for foundations to accept
that knowledge will necessarily be incremental
and imperfect.
Table 1 provides a set of mindset flags to help
foundations spot and discuss trap-like features
of linearity, certainty, control, denial, etc., when
they arise and to help identify alternative ways of
thinking.
THE
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Mindset Advice for Evaluators
Identify and acknowledge sources of uncertainty,
including inadequate knowledge about how to
produce desired outcomes [and] disagreements
among key actors about what to do, including
value conflicts. Nurture tolerance for ambiguity.
(Patton, 2011)

Ask Better Questions
Framing good questions for strategy has often
been challenging in the context of foundation
strategy. One aspect of the problem stems from
the narrow perspective that some foundations
typically take toward their work, i.e., one-by-one
grants and initiatives. Rather the strategy frame
needs to be enlarged to include a greater focus
on conditions and dynamics surrounding the
strategy – i.e. the types of markets of professionals and organizations and other actors, such as
political and regulatory, who drive or constrain
strategy evolution. As noted, a major part of the
problem has been that important assumptions
about motivation for change, such as participation levels or how change will actually deepen or
expand, are rarely examined. Another part of the
problem emerges from the way that questions
asked by foundation boards – "Did we move the
needle?” “Did we have an impact?” – deflect attention from what actually occurs.
Better questions emerge from real experience. As
the palliative-care advocates learned during the
implementation of their strategy, doing the work
of strategy can make strategists keen enough
to ask the right questions. Our experience as
evaluators has given us the opportunity to work
with excellent strategists and we have learned
that they share a common feature – a reliance on
“doing” as a way to make them smarter and more
effective strategist and change agents.
While there is no established method to identify the questions that may be most appropriate
for any given strategy, Table 2 suggests a way to
generate questions associated with a number of
the underlying assumptions surrounding these
strategies. This table is meant to provide a starting point for reflection.
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TABLE 1 Mindset Flags to Avoid Strategy Trapsx

From: Certainty and
Linear Tracking

Why the mindset is
problematic

To: Recognizing Complexity
and Strategic Learning

Simplified, linear, certain plan.

Distorts complexity, conceals
dynamics and what needs to be
learned during implementation.

Articulate and test assumptions,
understand the present through
data and experience.

There is a single right perspective
and approach.

Rarely true, and never perceived
as such; can be foundationcentric; can represent
confirmation bias.

Multiple perspectives and courses
of action are possible; keep an
eye on environmental conditions
that affect the feasibility of your
approach or the desirability of
alternatives.

Plan comprehensively before
doing.

Discounts emergence: Answering
all questions up front assumes a
static environment.

Evolve strategy by learning
from doing. Observe shorterterm results. Build in periodic
strategy updates based on same.
Examine what happens as a
result of strategy actions. Pilot
and test.

Exclusive/dominant focus on
philanthropic action/strategy.

Overly foundation-centric:
Focuses data collection on
foundation strategy rather
than how systems respond to
interventions.

View action and reaction as
part of a whole; treat context
as though it matters. Look at
variation – what happens under
different conditions.

Track for alignment.

Over-commitment: forces
alignment toward what might be
wrong.

Improvement through making
sense of what you see and learn;
align when it makes sense.

Measure what you can.

Often not “valid” – that is, not
really measuring what you want
it to measure or easy but not
relevant; focuses on counting and
calls it accountability.

Measure what matters: look at
experience – analyze data, look
for variation, interpret, and adapt.

Use a Disciplined Process to Support Strategic
Learning
Sidestepping the strategy traps illustrated in this
article requires more than just shifts in thinking
and better questions. It requires a process of reflection and decision to support strategic learning
and decision making. In this process, strategy is
treated as the actual theory that it is rather than a
blueprint for certain action.
While there is no single way to approach this
work, there are two major process features to
consider for better strategic learning:
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1. Engage a group of outsiders and insiders led
by an external strategy facilitator. A range of
important perspectives should be involved in
the learning and adaptation process. Reflection
requires input from both strategy insiders and
outsiders. Participants in the strategy, as well as
those affected by or influencing it, will have different views regarding the nature of the problem,
the feasibility of different approaches, and how
interventions are experienced over time. To be
successful, social-change strategists need to
incorporate better information and knowledge of
the experience from a wider range of perspectives
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TABLE 2 Sample Strategy Questions to Support Learning and Adaptation

Primary Assumption Areas

Questions to Consider

Who is in or out of the strategy? (Meadows,
2008; Ulrich, 2005; Westley, Zimmerman, &
Patton, 2006)

The nature of motivation

Assumptions about strategy being so compelling
or "right" can be a blinder to understanding deeper
sentiments, resistance, and nature of competition
for attention.

Explore motivations, incentives, and areas where
actors feel control exerted over them, by whom,
why, and how:
What are the historical and current major allegiances
for participants? To whom do they feel accountable?
What are the real or perceived costs to participation,
including opportunity costs?
What are the real or perceived costs to participation,
including opportunity costs?

Who benefits? (Attenborough, 2007; Schon,
1973; Williams & Hummelbrunner, 2010)

The nature of “benefit” to whom and why

What is the evidence and does it matter and to
whom? What is the actual experience?

Explore how the "problem" is framed and underlying
sentiments, sources:
How do actors articulate the problem? In what ways
does it vary? Where, how, and why does it differ
from dominant strategy perspective?
Who trusts whom, and why?
Explore actual experience of beneficiaries and
constituents:
How do “outcomes” vary? Who gains and who
loses, and why?

Is leverage viable? (Hagel, Brown, & Davison,
2010; Schon, 1983)

The nature of leverage and requirements for
deployment

Many assumptions about leverage but not well
understood; important arena for exploration.

Explore and question what leverage is; how and
when it works; whether it works now. Explore how
the surrounding system keeps things in stasis;
when, where, and why does the system make
change:
Where would a change in one part of the system
ripple through other parts?

and positions from within the systems they seek
to change. Also important is to be open to different types of knowledge from both practice and
formal research and from divergent opinions.
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Insiders (staff, key grantees) are susceptible to
biases when examining information about their
strategies. They tend to see their experiences as
unique, and therefore discount potentially useful
learning from analogous situations.
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To be successful, social-change
strategists need to incorporate better
information and knowledge of the
experience from a wider range of
perspectives and positions from
within the systems they seek to
change. Also important is to be open
to different types of knowledge from
both practice and formal research
and from divergent opinions.

Outsiders tend to be less biased and more
capable of generalizing across situations and
incorporating relevant data from previous decisions (Bazerman & Moore, 2009). Outsiders can
deliberately import different perspectives and
bodies of research to help the group make sense
of what they are learning and to surface potential
adaptations that could be tried. Outsiders might
include subject-matter experts with deep content
knowledge in the area, researchers who bring
data or evidence to bear about questions that
emerge, and practitioners from other fields who
have tried similar tactics or approaches.
External facilitation to guide reflective practice
and raise challenging questions will help the
group explore variation in perspective and action
that emerges from the strategy work. The facilitator can play devil’s advocate, push against
confirmatory bias, and examine what doesn’t
work as well as what does work (and for whom,
how, and why).
This is meant to be a pragmatic process designed
for productive participation – not every potential person or group involved with the strategy
should participate in these deliberations. Broader
input and feedback can be incorporated through
62

focus groups, alternate planning processes,
surveys, and other methods. This process can be
put into place experimentally – that is, through
piloting work with select strategies – while the
board, staff, and grantees come to understand
what learning might mean for them.
2. Commit to the process as ongoing and iterative
to support ongoing strategy adaptation. To be
adaptive, strategy under conditions of complexity
is iterative. There is no one-point-in-time process
that can suffice. Although there are no hard and
fast rules about how often strategy-related data
and potential adaptations should be considered,
in light of the level of uncertainty in complex settings, reflection needs to occur more frequently
than at the beginning, midpoint, and end of a
strategy; we suggest convening the group every
six months. This frequency of convening should
represent a period during which enough work
would have taken place to warrant questioning
and reflection, but not so long that the window of
opportunity to make decisions and adjustments
is lost.
By engaging in such a process, a foundation
makes a serious commitment to ask and address difficult questions. It requires dedication
and resources to gather information, collect and
analyze data, and – perhaps most important – to
reflect on what is learned in order to modify and
improve strategy. The strategy facilitator surfaces
questions as the strategy evolves and helps the
group commit to productive information gathering of various kinds – from evaluators, researchers, or reconnaissance by members of the group.
Older and newer approaches such as developmental evaluation (Patton, 2011) and reflective
practice (Schon, 1983; Argyris, 1982, 1993) can
provide advice and guidance for those assuming
this role.

The Value and Discipline of Strategic
Learning
Taking complexity seriously means that learning
be built on cycles of acting, sense making, and
drawing implications for action – as action is
the essence of strategy. Strategic learning is not
something to be done about strategy, but rather is
the core of strategy.
THE
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We challenge foundations to exercise their
strategic role by recognizing and accepting that
uncertainty exists; to use their freedom and flexibility to act, learn, fail, and do better; and to go
beyond their reliance on overly simplistic indicators. Paramount to this is the realization that
deep understanding of complex strategic work
can only emerge through action, reflection, and
more action (Schon, 1983; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand,
& Lampel, 1998; Mintzberg, 2007).

thinking and writing for this paper. The views
expressed in this publication are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent those
of Lumina Foundation, its officers, or employees.
We also want to thank readers of earlier drafts of
this paper who raised tough questions and made
great suggestions. They include Beth Bruner, Fred
Carden, Joel Epstein, Tom Gilmore, Nadya K.
Shmavonian, Darren Walker, and Peter York.

While we recognize that foundations operate
under constraints, few other entities have the
purview, freedom, or position to learn as well.
Foundations have the resources to support
information. And they have the freedom to try
and err.
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for more complex discussions that adequately
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to demonstrate here, it is only through learning
from action that a truly powerful strategy – one
with the potential to foster change and better
outcomes – can emerge and take hold.

Acknowledgements
We appreciate support from Lumina Foundation, which allowed us the time to do the reading,

THE

FoundationReview 2013 Vol 5:3

References

63

Patrizi, Thompson, Coffman, and Beer

for social goals and social organizations (pp. 37–42).
Columbus, OH: Grid.
Center for Evaluation Innovation. (2013). Evaluation in foundations: 2012 benchmarking data
[PowerPoint slides]. Washington, DC: Author.
Retrieved from http://www.evaluationroundtable.
org/documents/2012%20RT%20Benchmarking%20
Report.pdf
Coffman, J., Beer, T., Patrizi, P., & Thompson, E.
(2013). Benchmarking evaluation in foundations: Do
we know what we are doing? The Foundation Review,
5(2),36-51.
Friedman, M. (2009). Trying hard is not good enough:
How to produce measurable improvements in customers and communities. Charleston, SC: BookSurge.
Hagel, J., Brown, J. S., & Davison, L. (2010). The
power of pull: How small moves, smartly made, can
set big things in motion. New York: Basic Books.
Hirschman, A. O. (1961). Development projects observed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Hunter, D. E. K., & Nielson, S. B. (2013, Spring).
Performance management and evaluation: Exploring
complementarities. New Directions for Evaluation,
Special Issue: Performance Management and Evaluation, 2013(137), 7-17. DOI: 10.1002/ev.20042
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Lewin, K. (1946, November). Action research and minority problems. Journal of Social Issues, 2(4), 34-46.
Retrieved from http://bscw.wineme.fb5.uni-siegen.
de/pub/nj_bscw.cgi/d759359/5_1_ActionResearch
andMinortyProblems.pdf
Martin, D. M. (2012). Tactics in philanthropy: The
case of the moving spotlight. The Foundation Review,
4(3), 90-107.
Meadows, D. H. (2008). Thinking in systems: A primer.
White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green.
Mintzberg, H. (2007). Tracking strategies ... toward a
general theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B., & Lampel, J. (1998).
Strategy safari: A guided tour through the wilds of
strategic management. New York: Free Press.
Morino, M. (2011). Leap of reason: Managing to outcomes in an era of scarcity. Washington, DC: Venture
Philanthropy Partners.
Evaluation Roundtable & Patrizi Associates.
(2010). Use of evaluative information in foundations:
Benchmarking data [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved
from http://www.evaluationroundtable.org/

64

documents/et-benchmarking.ppt
Patrizi, P. A., & Patton, M. Q. (2010, Winter).
Evaluating strategy. New Directions for Evaluation,
128. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Patrizi, P., & Thompson, E. H. (2011). Beyond
the veneer of strategic philanthropy. Foundation
Review, 2(3), 52-60. Retrieved from http://www.
gvsu.edu/cms3/assets/C6EE62EC-E0C1-54F2D0212D5174A27DAF/pdf/tfr/tfr_beyond_the_
veneer_of_strategic_philanthropy.pdf
Patrizi, P., Thompson, E., & Spector, A. (2008).
Death is certain. Strategy isn’t: Assessing RWJF’s
end-of-life grantmaking. Case study presented at the
Strategy Forum of the Evaluation Roundtable, May
21-28, 2008. Retrieved from http://www.
evaluationroundtable.org/documents/cs-death-iscertain.pdf
Patton, M. Q. (2011). Developmental evaluation: Applying complexity concepts to enhance innovation and
use. New York: Guilford Press.
Pawson, R., Wong, G., & Owen, L. (2011). Known
knowns, known unknowns, unknown unknowns:
The predicament of evidence-based policy. American Journal of Evaluation, 32(4), 518-546. DOI:
10.1177/10982140114
Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. B. (1973). Implementation: How great expectations in Washington
are dashed in Oakland: Or, why it’s amazing that
federal programs work at all, this being a saga of the
economic development administration as told by two
sympathetic observers who seek to build morals on a
foundation of ruined hopes. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.
Reason, P. (2006). Choice and quality in action
research practice. Journal of Management Inquiry,
15(2), 187-203. Retrieved from http://peterreason.
eu/Papers/choice%20and%20quality.pdf
Reason, P. (2007). The SAGE handbook of action research: Participative inquiry and research. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Rumsfeld, D. (2002, February 12). Department of
Defense news briefing presented at the White House.
Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636
Schon, D. A. (1973). Beyond the stable state. New
York: W. W. Norton
Schon, D. A. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How
professionals think in action. London: Temple Smith.
Schall, E. (1994, February). Presidential address.

THE

FoundationReview 2013 Vol 5:3

Learning as Strategy

Presented at the meeting of the Association of Public
Policy Analysis and Management. Chicago, IL.
Stannard-Stockton, S. (2009, April). Is effective
philanthropy more than business strategy? [blog
post]. Retrieved from
http://www.tacticalphilanthropy.com/
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974, September 27).
Judgment under certainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, New Series, 185(4157), 1124–1131.
Ulrich, W. (2005). A brief introduction to critical
systems heuristics (CSH). Retrieved from http://
projects.kmi.open.ac.uk/ecosensus/publications/
ulrich_csh_intro.pdf
Westley, F., Zimmerman, B., & Patton, M. Q. (2006).
Getting to maybe: How the world is changed. Toronto,
ON: Vintage Canada.
Weiss, C. H. (1995). Nothing as practical as good
theory: Exploring theory-based evaluation for comprehensive community initiatives for children and
families. In J. P. Connell, A. C. Kubish, L. B. Schorr,
& C. H. Weiss (Eds.), New approaches to evaluating
community initiatives: Concepts, methods, and contexts (pp. 65–92). Washington, DC: Aspen Institute.
Williams, B., & Hummelbrunner, R. (2010). Systems
concepts in action: A practitioner’s toolkit. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Patricia Patrizi, M.A., M.S.S., is the founder and now
strategic advisor to the Evaluation Roundtable and principal
at Patrizi Associates. She formerly was the Director of Evaluation and Research at The Pew Charitable Trusts from 1988
through 1996. She can be reached at patti@patriziassociates.com.
Elizabeth Heid Thompson, B.A., was the associate director
of the Evaluation Roundtable until recently, and is a senior
analyst at Patrizi Associates. She formerly worked as an
evaluation staff at The Pew Charitable Trusts for ten years.
Julia Coffman, M.S., is founder and director of the Center
for Evaluation Innovation, and co-director of the Evaluation
Roundtable.
Tanya Beer, M.A., M.P.A., is associate director of the Center
for Evaluation Innovation and co-director of the Evaluation
Roundtable. She formerly worked as the Associate Director
of Reseach, Evaluation and Strategic Learning at The Colorado Trust.

THE

FoundationReview 2013 Vol 5:3

65

